Indian Foreign Secretary Visits Myanmar: Reading the Press Release
A point-wise analysis of the press release put out by India's Ministry of External Affairs after the visit of Foreign Secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, on 22-23 December 2021.
On 22-23 December 2021, India’s Foreign Secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, made an official visit to Myanmar. Thus, India became the third country after China and Thailand to have sent a high-level emissary to the Southeast Asian country since the military coup on 1 February 2021.
Shringla met with the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar military and coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, representatives of political parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), civil society members, and a select group of foreign envoys based in Yangon.
Following the visit, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) put out a 7-point press release (PR) detailing activities undertaken by Shringla in Myanmar and various points of discussion with the coup leader. The junta put out its own version through its propaganda mouthpiece, The Global New Light of Myanmar.
This analysis discusses each point in India’s PR.
Point 1. Foreign Secretary is on a working visit to Myanmar from December 22 to 23, 2021. During his visit, he called on the Chairman, State Administrative Council and other senior representatives and held meetings with members of civil society and political parties, including the National League for Democracy. He is also scheduled to meet Myanmar-based Ambassadors, and representatives of the UN.
Analysis: “State Administrative Council” is what the junta calls itself. Thus, the use of the term “Chairman, State Administrative Council” in the Indian PR may be read by some as a tacit recognition by New Delhi of the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing’s self-established political authority and in turn, the junta’s legitimacy. However, diplomacy is not a black-and-white affair and words or phrases always straddle a grey area of interpretation.
Notably, the PR exclusively mentions Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (which won the November 2020 general election, but was later deposed by the military), but not the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), despite the fact that Shringla met representatives from both. This could be seen as India’s pro-democracy message to the junta.
Point 2. During his meetings with all concerned, Foreign Secretary emphasized India’s interest in seeing Myanmar’s return to democracy at the earliest; release of detainees and prisoners; resolution of issues through dialogue; and complete cessation of all violence. He reaffirmed India’s strong and consistent support to the ASEAN initiative and expressed hope that progress would be made in a pragmatic and constructive manner, based on the five point consensus.
Analysis: These points are not new. New Delhi has made these exact assertions on several occasions in different forums since February. See this tracker for details on India’s past statements on the coup. They are essentially designed to show support for democracy in Myanmar.
However, the ‘ASEAN initiative’ based on the ‘Five-Point Consensus’ remains stalled, thanks to the junta’s foot-dragging and now, the soft stance shown by the new ASEAN chair, Cambodia (led by Hun Sen). Further, despite the fact that it is the junta that started the cycle of violence after the coup and continues to use disproportionate force against civilians, the Indian PR doesn't blame the military for the violence, but only talks about "cessation of all violence". This goes to the heart of India’s “tightrope diplomacy” in Myanmar, which aims at supporting democracy while keeping the Tatmadaw in its good books. India took the same middle position after the military’s violent “clearance operations” against the Rohingya in Northern Rakhine State, which created a massive humanitarian crisis in August-September 2017 and ultimately forced more than 800,000 Rohingya to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh.
Point 3. Emphasizing that India shares a long border with Myanmar, Foreign Secretary conveyed India’s continued humanitarian support for the people of Myanmar. In the context of Myanmar’s fight against the Covid-19 pandemic, he handed over one million doses of "Made in India” vaccines to the Myanmar Red Cross Society. A part of this consignment would be utilized for communities living along Myanmar’s border with India. A grant of 10,000 tons of rice and wheat to Myanmar was also announced.
Analysis: This shows India's persistent focus on the India-Myanmar border, not just as a security concern, but also as a pivot for development and people-to-people relations. Without the goodwill of the border population on both sides, India’s outreach to Myanmar will remain stunted.
Regarding the “Made in India” COVID-19 vaccinations, India gave them to the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS), unlike China, which supplied its flagship Sinopharm shots directly to the junta. India’s decision to route its delivery through the MRCS – an organisation with solid experience in humanitarian work – is prudent, given the junta’s dubious record in governance, healthcare and crisis management.
Note that China, besides supplying vaccines to the junta, is reportedly also delivering them (and other emergency medical aid) to Ethnic Armed Organisations in the north – such as the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIA), Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). This is the standard Chinese playbook in Myanmar – placing its cards on all available tables. The Indian strategy, on the other hand, remains more constrained.
Point 4. Foreign Secretary expressed India's continued support for people-centric socio-economic developmental projects, including those along the India-Myanmar border areas, as well as India’s commitment for expeditious implementation of ongoing connectivity initiatives such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway. Foreign Secretary also reiterated India’s commitment to continue with the projects under Rakhine State Development Programme and Border Area Development Programme for the benefit of the people of Myanmar.
Analysis: India has been funding border area projects in Myanmar since over decades now, mostly through its Border Area Development Programme (BADP). The BADP was extended to the blocks bordering Myanmar in 1997-98. Recently, the government has further extended its ambit to also cover people living in the bordering areas on the other side. Once again, this speaks to the importance that New Delhi accords to the border population as a vehicle for building long-term linkages between India, Myanmar and beyond.
The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit and Transport Project (KMMTTP), which has long been under construction and was nearing completion before the coup, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway project, which began in micro phases last year, are important initiatives for India within both the Act East Policy (AEP) framework and its overall connectivity push in the immediate neighbourhood. But in the current context, both of them might end up contributing to the coffers of junta-linked firms, given that the military has fully captured the state and its revenue streams. This is something India needs to be careful about.
Finally, India has been supporting the Rakhine State Development Programme (RSDP) since almost four years now. The RSDP was agreed upon by New Delhi and the deposed Suu Kyi government in December 2017, in the wake of the extreme violence and displacement that the Rohingya Muslims in northern Rakhine State faced at the hands of the Myanmar military in August that year. But, it has always been a very limited assistance programme that has also failed to cater to all communities in Rakhine State, particularly the Rohingya (who are systematically marginalised and discriminated against). India needs to realise that unless the Rohingya get full citizenship and economic parity in Myanmar, development programmes like the RSDP will remain structurally biased. The Rakhine issue is more political and economic.
Point 5. The visit also provided an opportunity to raise matters relating to India’s security, especially in the light of the recent incident in Churachandpur district in southern Manipur. Foreign Secretary stressed the need to put an end to any violence and maintain peace and stability in the border areas. Both sides reiterated their commitment to ensure that their respective territories would not be allowed to be used for any activities inimical to the other.
Analysis: This is a crucial point. The Indian side’s mention of the recent deadly ambush of an Assam Rifles convoy in Manipur’s Churachandpur district, which killed an Indian Army colonel, his wife, and son, has a clear message for the Tatmadaw – get your act together on your side of the border to prevent future attacks on Indian security forces; and if not, then be ready to face the heat from anti-junta entities hobbling close to (or inside) Indian territory. Notably, the attack, which was claimed by Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF), was perpetrated by rebels who had crossed over from the Myanmar side.
The bit about how “their respective territories would not be allowed to be used for any activities inimical to the other” is a standard mutual commitment that both sides routinely make in their bilateral statements. In reality, however, this agreement rests on shaky grounds, as the India-Myanmar border is an unpredictable frontier with complex overlapping interests between various politico-security actors who operate on the basis of rapidly shifting circumstances. For instance, there are credible reports to suggest that the Myanmar military is using Indian insurgents, mostly Manipuri, to attack anti-junta militias inside Burmese territory. Read this recent analysis by veteran Burma watcher, Bertil Lintner, for more context. In such a situation, the Tatmadaw is bound to go soft on anti-India rebels who are helping them. As the Burmese army faces mounting strain on its recruitment sources, it is expected to rely even more on hired hands – which then means more stable safe havens for Indian insurgents inside Myanmar.
Point 6. India shares an approximately 1700 kms long border with Myanmar. Any developments in that country have a direct impact on India’s bordering regions. Peace and stability in Myanmar remain of utmost importance to India, specifically to its North Eastern Region.
Analysis: India has made this point on other occasions since the coup. This is yet another instance of New Delhi telling the junta to prevent the violence from spilling over to the Indian side, or more refugees entering India as a result of clashes in border states like Chin and Sagaing. New Delhi remains concerned about the heightened refugee influx since the February coup, and would want to keep it to a manageable level.
Point 7. As a democracy and close neighbour, India has been involved in the democratic transition process in Myanmar and in this context has worked with various stakeholders in developing capacities on democratic systems and practices. India proposes to renew these efforts for Myanmar to emerge as a stable, democratic, federal union in accordance with the wishes of the people of Myanmar.
Analysis: This is an interesting point that spurred some speculations in the Indian media about New Delhi offering to “mediate” between various groups in Myanmar (I fell for it too). While calling it a proposal for mediation would be incorrect (New Delhi doesn’t even have the bandwidth to do so), this is India offering to resume its democratic capacity-building initiatives in Myanmar. Over the past decade, as Myanmar transitioned from military rule to a quasi-civilian democracy, India conducted several trainings, workshops and other programmes to strengthen the democratic process and institutions in Myanmar.
However, this is a weak proposition in the current context, because Myanmar’s problem today goes far beyond “democratic capacity”. It is much more fundamental and structural. Today, Myanmar faces a political crisis brought about by the military-drafted 2008 Constitution, which preserves the Tatmadaw’s political authority. This is also what maintains the centralising nature of the Burmese national project, hindering the emergence of a truly democratic federal union where all ethnic nations have equal agency. Unless the 2008 constitution is abolished (or thoroughly reformed), no amount of democratic capacity-building can salvage Myanmar. The very fact that the country relapsed into junta rule overnight despite ten years of elaborate politico-legal reforms proves this. New Delhi needs to understand this bare fact.