India's tightrope balancing on Myanmar continues
From New Delhi to Naypyitaw, India remains stubbornly risk-averse on its Myanmar policy.
On 28 May, The Hindu reported that India would not invite Myanmar’s junta-appointed foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, to the Special ASEAN-India Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (SAIFMM) currently underway in New Delhi.
Instead, India, the report said, would extend an invite to a “non-military, non-political” representative, most probably the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chan Aye. He was also to attend the ASEAN-India Senior Officials’ Meeting (AISOM) held in New Delhi on 15 June.
However, Chan Aye did not attend the meeting. Instead, the junta sent its ambassador in India, Moe Kyaw Aung, to participate in the AISOM.
At the SAIFMM, Myanmar’s chair remained unoccupied.
India expectedly justified its decision by pointing to ASEAN’s own consensus of banning the junta foreign minister from its own meetings. Some pressure from the US is also likely.
I had earlier argued that India’s decision to boycott the junta foreign minister (FM) wasn’t a wholly insignificant development, since New Delhi had so far been extra-cautious about not offending the Myanmar junta.
I had also argue that a non-invite to the junta FM doesn’t mean India will cut off the military regime completely or stop engaging with it at a bilateral level. Some recent developments have confirmed this.
While India skipped an invite to Lwin, the newly-appointed Indian ambassador to Myanmar, Vinay Kumar, met with him in Naypyitaw on 14 June – one day before the AISOM and two days before the SAIFMM in New Delhi.
The timing of the meeting is interesting. Is India compensating for the non-invite to the senior junta minister by giving him exclusive audience in Naypyitaw? It certainly looks like that. One could even argue that such official one-to-one meetings with junta ministers is tantamount to recognising (and legitimising) the coup regime.
Notably, the Indian embassy in Yangon has not publicised the meeting on its Twitter and Facebook accounts. It is possible that New Delhi doesn’t want to overemphasise or overplay its engagement with the junta to avoid drawing the ire of the people in Myanmar.
But, this makes little sense as the news (and photographs) were published by the junta propaganda mouthpiece and on the junta MOFA’s Facebook account. Needless to say, these were then picked up by the international media. Did the Indian government not know this would happen? One is hard pressed to believe so.
Notably, the Indian envoy also met the junta-appointed Union Minister for Construction, U Shwe Lay, on 15 June in the Burmese capital, as reported by the pro-junta MITV. They discussed road and integrated check-post construction projects along the India-Myanmar border in Manipur/Sagaing Region and Mizoram/Chin State.
These projects, which are critical to India’s eastern connectivity and trade agendas, had stalled after the February 2021 coup and the ensuing instability. Clearly, New Delhi is now eager to resume them and is willing to work with the junta to that end. In other words, India still seems to believe that the junta is in a position to secure its developmental interests along the restive borderlands.
Whether that is actually the case is a different matter altogether. Both Chin State and Sagaing Region have emerged as hotspots for the anti-military armed resistance, and the junta is barely able to maintain its remit in these areas.
Moreover, the junta is reportedly using Indian insurgents as mercenaries to attack civilian militias in return for safe haven in these areas – which is patently against Indian interests. Is India simply looking away from this rogue behaviour of the Burmese Generals for the sake of continuing bilateral relations? Or has it managed to force the junta to abandon this treacherous tactical alliance?
Then, on 13 June, in a statement made during an informal meeting at the UN General Assembly on the “Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar”, India said the following on the post-coup situation:
“We have concerns over violence perpetrated by any [emphasised through underline] side.”
While India has consistently maintained a neutral line on political or communal violence in Myanmar (including the Rohingya crisis), this is the first time it has pointedly called out violence by “all” sides since the 2021 putsch. So far, it had only issued vague and generic condemnation of the violence.
In the statement, India also avoided the term “Rohingya”, using “displaced persons from the Rakhine State” instead. This is in line with its core position on the Rohingya issue.
What is notable, however, is that the National Unity Government (NUG), which is the parallel civilian government in Myanmar made up of mostly NLD lawmakers, has officially started using the term “Rohingya”. It is only the military that refuses to use the term. So clearly, India continues to uphold the junta’s sensitivities.
These will do well to keep India in the junta’s good books. For Min Aung Hlaing, India’s neutrality is valuable in the face of growing global condemnation of the coup as it helps legitimise his illegal and brutal regime.
In India’s mind, good relations with the junta is some sort of a putative guarantee against deeper Chinese influence in Myanmar. (Interestingly, Chan Aye, whom India was supposed to invite to the ASEAN-India meetings in New Delhi as a “non-political, non-military” representative, attended the virtual 28th ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Consultation (ACSOC) on 10 June.)
But, Indian neutrality won’t float well with the pro-democracy political class and civil society in Myanmar, including members of the NUG. There have been enough signs already to that end.
In all, India continues to maintain its diplomatic tightrope on Myanmar with perhaps a few tweaks – such as following the ASEAN track on boycotting junta ministers for multilateral meetings. However, even on the latter, India seems to be balancing it off with special bilateral meetings with top junta figures.